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Abstract We investigate ‘‘dual headquarters involvement’’, i.e., corporate and
divisional headquarters’ simultaneous involvement in innovation development
projects hosted by subsidiaries of multibusiness firms. Drawing on selective hier-
archical involvement theory and the literature on subsidiary network embeddedness,
we analyze 83 innovation projects in 22 multibusiness firms and find that the
number of partners in the projects, rather than subsidiary intra- and inter-divisional
embeddedness acts as a driver of dual headquarters involvement. We do however
find that intra- and inter-divisional embeddedness is positively related to dual
headquarters involvement when the number of partners in the innovation project is
relatively large. These results lend support to the idea that parenting in complex
organizations entail complex headquarters structures. Our results suggest that we
need to go beyond simple conceptualizations of headquarters and that considering
different dimensions of the innovating subsidiary’s network helps in explaining dual
headquarters involvement.
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1 Introduction
During the last decade, research on the role and function that headquarters play in
complex multibusiness organizations such as multinational corporations (MNCs)
has been invigorated. Recent contributions have investigated how headquarters
attempt to add value to the organization (Nell and Ambos 2013), for example by
transferring knowledge to their subsidiaries (e.g., Nell et al. 2016; Parmigiani and
Holloway 2011), by enabling the development and the sharing of innovations within
the firm (e.g., Ciabuschi et al. 2011a; Dellestrand and Kappen 2012; Un and
Cuervo-Cazurra 2004), or by managing inter-divisional conflicts and uncertainty
(Poppo 2003).
While this stream of literature has substantially advanced our understanding of
headquarters roles and functions (also called parenting activities), it is surprisingly
silent on one of the key characteristics of parenting in complex organizations—
parenting configurations. Goold and Campbell (2002) are among the first to
highlight that parenting in complex organizations usually goes hand in hand with a
more complex structure of parenting itself. For example, in complex organizations,
parenting activities are often allocated to several headquarters (Alfoldi et al. 2012;
Birkinshaw et al. 2006; Nell et al. 2017) or even to subsidiaries (e.g., Centers of
Excellence, cf., Frost et al. 2002). Furthermore, complex organizations experience
that multiple headquarters simultaneously interact with a particular subsidiary when
they attempt to add value. For example, a subsidiary in Japan, engaging in a new
innovation project, might simultaneously coordinate its actions with the divisional
headquarters for wind turbines in Denmark, but it might also interact and experience
involvement from corporate headquarters in the United States.
Current research largely disregards these nested and interdependent headquar-
ters’ structures and instead tends to focus on individual headquarters (see Baaij and
Slangen 2013; Hoenen and Kostova 2015). This is unfortunate because issues such
as matrix structures and complex multiple headquarters organizations seem to re-
emerge in many companies (Birkinshaw et al. 2016; Egelhoff et al. 2013; Wolf and
Egelhoff 2013). Furthermore, simultaneous linkages between a subsidiary and
multiple headquarters can create overlaps of authority and interaction, and
maintaining such redundancies is costly (Williamson 1975). For example, the joint
venture literature has shown that the involvement of a larger number of parents can
have detrimental performance implications for subsidiaries (Gong et al. 2007; Luo
et al. 2001) and the matrix literature has emphasized dysfunctional conflicts arising
due to several intervening headquarters (Galbraith 2009). Or, as Egelhoff (1988,
p. 4) puts it, ‘‘dual hierarchies involve more managers and staffs, and since the goals
and strategic concerns of the two often concern the same resources, considerable
managerial effort has to be put into constructive conflict resolution’’. Although
multiple parenting structures can be harmful for the subsidiaries, we still have a
limited understanding of the questions why and under which circumstances firms
nevertheless opt for organizing their parenting in such a way.
This article sheds light on the issue of multiple headquarters involvement in the
context of innovation development projects hosted by subsidiaries. Drawing on
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selective hierarchical involvement theory (Poppo 2003) and the literature on
subsidiary network embeddedness (Andersson et al. 2002; Meyer et al. 2011), we
investigate drivers of divisional and corporate headquarters involvement in
subsidiary innovation development processes in terms of the allocation of
(managerial) resources to the same innovation development projects. We refer to
this phenomenon as ‘‘dual headquarters involvement’’ (Birkinshaw et al. 2016). We
use the MNC as our research context and depict such a multibusiness firm as a
complex organization with multiple headquarters and subsidiaries that are internally
embedded (Meyer et al. 2011). Our overarching argument is that the way in which
the subsidiary is embedded within the organization drives dual headquarters
involvement. Specifically, we explore instances where the subsidiary innovation
project is internally embedded in the corporate network—both within and beyond its
business division—and use this as a marker of organizational complexity.
Moreover, we consider the size of the subsidiary’s innovation network in order to
further investigate organizational complexity.
For headquarters, it is a critical task to govern inter-unit relationships within
multibusiness firms and manage the development of innovations that may be critical
for the competitive advantage of the organization (Edwards et al. 2015; Hong
Chung et al. 2006). By focusing on the nature and role of multiple headquarters in
complex organizations, we address a phenomenon that has remained largely
unexplored in the literature, both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
Consequently, our findings contribute in a number of ways. First, we contribute to
the literature on parenting in complex structures (e.g. Birkinshaw et al. 2006; Foss
et al. 2012; Galbraith 2009; Kostova et al. 2016; Poppo 2003). This literature
predicts that dual headquarters involvement is unlikely to occur since it is costly and
draws on the scarce resources and attention of headquarters staff (Ambos et al.
2010; Nell et al. 2011; Poppo 2003), since it runs counter the traditional M-form
logic (Chandler 1991; Verbeke and Kenworthy 2008; Williamson 1975), and
because it increases the likelihood of conflicts and coordination problems (Goold
and Campbell 2002; Gong et al. 2007). Yet, we highlight circumstances under
which we can expect to observe overlapping headquarters’ involvement.
We find that innovation network size, rather than subsidiary embeddedness
within and beyond their division (later referred to as intra-/inter-divisional
embeddedness), acts as a driver of dual headquarters involvement. However,
intra-/inter-divisional embeddedness is positively related to dual headquarters
involvement when the innovation networks are relatively large. In this paper, we
thus identify and explain a rationale for what may appear as redundant and costly
headquarters-subsidiary interaction patterns. To this end, we extend what Poppo
(2003, p. 405) called a ‘‘theory of selective corporate involvement’’ by specifying
influencing factors and their interactions when explaining more than the involve-
ment of just one single (corporate) headquarters. A second contribution of our paper
is that it responds to the call for further research on internal embeddedness of
subsidiaries (Garcia-Pont et al. 2009; Meyer et al. 2011). We add understanding to
the issue of headquarters involvement in subsidiary activities in terms of elucidating
a variation in headquarters involvement as contingent on subsidiary network
elements (i.e., intra-/inter-divisional embeddedness and network size) (Saka-
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Helmhout 2007). Third, we contribute to the literature on the management of
dispersed innovations in large diversified firms (Regne´r and Zander 2014). We
provide support for the presence of simultaneous headquarters involvement in
innovation development projects. To our knowledge, this phenomenon has received
only scarce attention. Thus, we hereby extend previous work on single headquar-
ters’ involvement in innovation projects (Ciabuschi et al. 2011a; Dellestrand and
Kappen 2011). Furthermore, we suggest that taking into account the involvement of
several headquarters in the same innovation projects can capture a more holistic
view of the innovation governance mechanisms applied within firms.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Parenting in the Multibusiness Firm
Multibusiness firms can be defined as organizations that operate in more than one
product or geographic market and that, as a consequence, structure their corporation
into separate divisions (e.g., business units with a particular product or geographic
area focus) (Chandler 1962). This type of organization has been termed the ‘‘M-
form’’ organization (Williamson 1983) and is considered one of the most important
organizational innovations. The M-form organization usually goes hand in hand
with the establishment of different types of headquarters such as corporate,
divisional, and regional headquarters (Stopford and Wells 1972). These headquar-
ters co-exist and it has traditionally been argued that they are responsible for a
differentiated set of tasks and activities (Chandler 1991; Foss 1997). The reasoning
is based on theories of information processing and transaction costs (Martin and
Eisenhardt 2010). The information processing view argues that individual top
managers at the corporate center suffer from cognitive limitations. In turn,
delegating operational decision-making to divisions is thus considered to be
efficiency-enhancing. However, the corporate center has presumably superior
knowledge regarding the overall external business environment of the firm and the
linkages that exist between separate divisions. For example, Martin and Eisenhardt
(2010, p. 267) summarize that, ‘‘although not fully developed […], the information
processing view does suggest that corporate executives are likely to have the best
information about the most valuable cross-BU collaborative opportunities and thus
are likely to orchestrate the most effective cross-BU collaborations’’. From a
transaction-cost perspective, it has been argued that divisional headquarters are
better positioned to oversee and monitor activities within the division as compared
to corporate headquarters but that the latter would focus on firm-wide incentives and
control systems (Williamson 1975). Furthermore, Williamson (1975) claimed that
in ‘‘corrupted’’ M-forms, corporate managers would be intensively involved in
divisional affairs, which diverts them from objectively evaluating divisions and
allocating resources. Thus, the literature suggests a clear separation between
corporate headquarters activities such as performance evaluation (financial control),
resource allocation, and (long-term) corporate strategy formulation and divisional/
regional headquarters activities which are more oriented towards the operational
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activities of their divisions. That is, there is, in principle, only selective involvement
of the corporate headquarters in divisional affairs and there is relatively limited
coordination of activities across divisions (Verbeke and Kenworthy 2008).
In sum, the classic M-form posits a strictly hierarchical organization with corporate
and divisional headquarters justifying their existence by adding value to the
corporation in specific ways. However, despite the general appeal of these claims,
many scholars have identified its limitations. While it is generally acknowledged that
top management’s resources are limited, scholars started offering contingencies that
warrant a deviation from the classic organization. For example, Poppo (2003)
summarizes that corporate headquarters activities (also called ‘‘parenting activities’’,
Goold et al. 1998) are not necessarily destructive but that inter-divisional
collaboration and coordination initiated and managed by the corporate center can
represent a source of advantage. She identified a gap in specifying under which
circumstances corporate headquarters might steer and involve itself in inter-divisional
affairs. Her results show that higher uncertainty as well as the existence of valuable
assets used across divisions increase the likelihood that corporate headquarters
involves itself in inter-divisional dispute resolution. Similarly, Eisenmann and Bower
(2000, p. 349) argue that the classic M-form is suitable in cases of unrelated
diversification. The existence of economies of scope potentials would warrant
‘‘fundamentally different management practices’’. Under such conditions, corporate
headquarters should be involved in divisional operating decisions, delegate less to the
divisions, and employ more mechanisms that help promoting inter-unit cooperation
(Eisenmann and Bower 2000; Gupta and Govindarajan 1986; Hill et al. 1992).
This research has contributed to our understanding of the inner workings of large
corporations and the role different types of headquarters play in these organizations.
However, there are still a number of outstanding issues. While prior research has
highlighted some contingencies to the classic M-form organization, ‘‘empirical
findings have often been statistically modest’’ (Martin and Eisenhardt 2010, p. 266)
and a theory of selective involvement of headquarters can still be considered
underdeveloped (Foss et al. 2012; Poppo 2003). Furthermore, extant research
focuses nearly exclusively on the firm-level and investigates corporate headquarters
involvement in divisional affairs (Martin and Eisenhardt 2010). That is, it disregards
that the parenting processes can be more complex and that corporate and divisional
headquarters might simultaneously involve themselves in and interact with units
below the divisional level. This issue is particularly visible in the literature on
subsidiaries of MNCs where individual subsidiaries are usually conceptualized as
units dealing with only one single headquarters which could be the corporate or
divisional headquarters. Put differently, current research largely disregards nested
headquarters structures within large firms and the fact that subsidiaries might
experience involvement in its activities by more than just one headquarters unit
(Hoenen and Kostova 2015). Such multiple interaction patterns between one
subsidiary and several types of headquarters would reflect complex parenting
situations which are covered in extant literature only to a very limited extent (see
Goold and Campbell 2002).
In this paper we define a situation where both corporate and divisional
headquarters are involved in particular subsidiary-level processes and activities as a
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situation of dual headquarters involvement. We describe innovation activities in
large multibusiness firms that are also internationally dispersed and focus on these
activities as they provide an appropriate empirical setting for dual headquarters
involvement (Edwards et al. 2015; Regne´r and Zander 2014). While we have
advanced our knowledge on selective corporate headquarters involvement (Poppo
2003), we think that a theory of selective dual headquarters involvement would
complement extant research and provide valuable insights into multibusiness firms’
organizations.
2.2 Innovation in the Multibusiness Firm
Traditionally, for firms leveraging their innovation capabilities across product
markets and country borders, early processes of innovation and upgrading of
capabilities was a corporate, i.e., a headquarters matter. Over time, however,
subsidiaries have come to account for an increasing share of all innovation
initiatives within the firm (e.g., Cantwell 1989; Dunning 1994; Reger 2002). Firms
realized that they can profit from the multitude of unique environmental contexts in
which they are embedded via their subsidiaries (Regne´r and Zander 2014).
Asmussen and Pedersen (2009) show that specific subsidiary capabilities are
developed in locations where these capabilities are necessary to compete or survive
in the market. In other words, the international dispersion of the firm enables it to
develop innovations somewhere in its network that it would not develop in the home
location due to differences in environmental factors such as demand or supply
conditions, or the level and type of competition (Asmussen and Pedersen 2009). The
firm profits from dispersed innovative activities when it manages to leverage
resources across the rest of the firm, that is, when it realizes economies of scope. In
fact, it has been argued that the MNC exists because it is a superior vehicle to
manage such transfer of innovations, knowledge, and capabilities across borders as
compared to the market (Kogut and Zander 1993).
In sum, within multibusiness firms operating in several country markets,
subsidiaries have become important actors in developing innovations (Birkinshaw
and Hood 1998). However, Asakawa (2001) argue that most subsidiaries are quite
disconnected from the rest of the firm when they are working on new innovations.
Such isolation can be detrimental for subsequent transfer to the rest of the firm as
possible transfer channels and relationships to other units within the firm have to be
re-developed or installed newly. Furthermore, a relatively isolated development
process leads to information asymmetries. Other units of the firm—including
headquarters units—are likely to lack in-depth knowledge of the kind of innovation
that the subsidiary is developing. To this end, previous literature has investigated the
role of headquarters’ involvement in subsidiary innovation activities (e.g.,
Ciabuschi et al. 2011b; Dellestrand and Kappen 2012). The central idea is that
headquarters involves itself because some of the above-mentioned problems can be
overcome. Dual headquarters involvement, however, has not been covered so far in
extant literature. We focus on explaining dual headquarters involvement in
innovation projects in the following sections.
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3 Hypothesis Development
Given that a lot of innovation development in the multibusiness firm takes place at
the subsidiary level, and that innovations substantially contribute to the competitive
advantage of the entire firm, it seems plausible that headquarters (both divisional
and corporate) have an interest in involving themselves in subsidiary innovation
development processes. Headquarters involvement can be conceived as non-
financial resource allocation (Bower and Gilbert 2005). It corresponds to managerial
skill, knowledge of organizational processes and routines, the ability to identify
complementarities within the organization, and information make up a differenti-
ated set of tangible and intangible resources (Barney et al. 2001; Dellestrand and
Kappen 2011). We are focusing on such non-financial resources allocated by
headquarters which we conceive as related to the notion of positive attention
received by subsidiaries (Ambos and Birkinshaw 2010; Bouquet and Birkinshaw
2008).
For headquarters, it makes sense to focus on becoming knowledgeable of and to
participate in the incidence of innovation development since innovations are costly
to develop but potentially crucial for the competitive advantage of the whole
organization (Teece 1977). Trying to facilitate innovation development can thus be
understood as a part of the value adding role of headquarters. It can also have the
additional benefit of headquarters being more knowledgeable about innovations
once they are ready for subsequent transfer throughout the organization. As a
corollary, involvement during the development phase enables headquarters to
perform its knowledge directing function (Foss 1997) and provide appropriate
support during a subsequent innovation transfer phase. Put differently, by involving
itself in innovation development processes at a focal subsidiary, it becomes a
participant in the innovation development network and is thus not an outsider of the
specific innovation network, decreasing any potential liability of outsidership
(Johanson and Vahlne 2009; Vahlne et al. 2012).
However, while being involved is a way for headquarters to create value,
headquarters need to be selective about when to become involved. Indeed,
managerial attention and resources are limited and headquarters cannot be involved
in all subsidiary processes (Ocasio 1997; Bouquet and Birkinshaw 2008). Thus,
headquarters will choose to become involved in subsidiary innovation processes
when it perceives that it can help and/or gain from these processes. Corporate and
divisional headquarters will follow a similar reasoning in deciding where to direct
their attention and resources. This implies that both headquarters can be involved in
the same subsidiary innovation processes. Yet, this simultaneous involvement of
multiple headquarters is less likely to add value. Managers from divisional and
corporate headquarters have different—and sometimes divergent—interests and
concerns (Egelhoff 1988). Thus, when managers from both types of headquarters
are involved in the same subsidiary innovation processes, this will result in overlaps
of authority and interaction that are likely to create conflicts (Williamson 1975).
Because the simultaneous involvement of multiple types of headquarters can be
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inefficient and costly, it is important to understand why multibusiness firms opt for
this activity.
The question then becomes: what drives the dual involvement of headquarters in
the same subsidiary innovation development processes?
As suggested, resource constraints force headquarters to selectively rank-order
and pick innovation projects to support. This winner-picking situation is likely to be
driven by the perceived importance of the innovations in terms of the potential to
add value to the firm. Innovations that are considered important drive the attention
of headquarters and its involvement in the development process, because
headquarters will want to help and benefit from these innovations. This builds on
the notion that innovations with greater importance for the firm are expected to add
more to its competitive advantage than less important innovations.
An important signal of the importance of the subsidiary innovation process is the
embeddedness of the innovative subsidiary within the firm (Teece 1977). Despite
the fact that the innovating subsidiary is probably collaborating with actors external
to the firm, most subsidiaries still maintain linkages to units within the firm
(Andersson et al. 2002; Ghoshal and Bartlett 1990). That is, innovative activity at
the subsidiary-level does seldom occur in complete isolation from other activities
inside the firm but is embedded within the firm. We argue that the way the
innovative subsidiary is internally embedded within the firm allows for explaining
the occurrence of dual headquarters involvement.
We propose that subsidiaries within the division as well as subsidiaries in other
divisions (but inside the firm) may participate and provide resources to the
innovation development process (Ghoshal and Bartlett 1990). For example, within
the Swedish multinational Eriksson, an innovative unit that develops technology
ideas would maintain linkages to and draw on insights from the network equipment
division as well as the mobile devices division. This way of embedding itself
internally provides the innovating unit with a heterogeneous set of knowledge,
ideas, and opportunities that facilitates innovation development.
Subsidiaries that maintain linkages within and beyond their divisions during
innovation development processes send a strong signal of centrality and potential
importance of the project to both corporate and divisional headquarters. In
particular, embeddedness within the division shows that the innovation being
developed has not only potential for the subsidiary but also for other subsidiaries
within the division. Thus, intra-divisional embeddedness is likely to drive the
involvement of divisional headquarters in the innovation development. Similarly,
linkages with subsidiaries in other divisions show that the innovation being
developed has potential benefits and applications for other divisions as well. As a
result of inter-divisional embeddedness, corporate headquarters is likely to become
involved in the innovation process. This echoes the notion of innovations being
strategically important issues to which hierarchical units pay attention to (Dutton
and Ashford 1993). Along these lines, subsidiaries that maintain linkages both
within and beyond their divisions are likely to attract the attention and involvement
of both corporate and divisional headquarters.
In addition to making the potential benefits of the innovation more visible, the
linkages that the subsidiaries maintain within and beyond their divisions increase
B. Decreton et al.
123
the potential for conflicts within the division and with other divisions, respectively.
For example, units outside the innovating subsidiary’s division might be reluctant to
spend time and managerial resources on a ‘‘foreign’’ innovation project. Further-
more, compensation issues can occur that might require internal transfer pricing
when new innovations draw directly on proprietary assets from other divisions. As
the intra-/inter-divisional embeddedness makes the importance of the innovation to
both corporate and divisional headquarters more visible, both headquarters will have
larger incentives to solve the conflicts that might arise as a result of the increased
complexity. Divisional headquarters are likely to become involved to address issues
between subsidiaries of the division while corporate headquarters are likely to
become involved to solve conflicts between divisions (Poppo 2003).
This argumentation is also valid when corporate and divisional headquarters
interact with each other, as each of the two wants to be involved in order to
(potentially) direct and benefit from the innovations. Thus, we argue that intra-/
inter-divisional embeddedness leads to dual headquarters involvement in order to
solve problems as well as to add value:
Hypothesis 1: Intra-/inter-divisional embeddedness of the innovative sub-
sidiary is positively related to dual headquarters involvement in innovation
development processes.
One of the characteristics that depict well the complexity of an innovation
process is the size of the innovation network (Capaldo 2007; Cuevas-Rodrı´guez
et al. 2014; Schilling and Phelps 2007). This builds on the idea that the innovating
unit needs to collaborate with many different partners within and outside the firm
(Andersson et al. 2002). A larger innovation development network implies a greater
complexity to manage (Dhanaraj and Parkhe 2006), i.e., the developing subsidiary
may not on its own possess the resources to handle all network relationships. A large
innovation network is also frequently related to conflict and uncertainties during the
development process (Ha˚kansson and Ford 2002; Koch 2004).
Divisional headquarters are likely to become involved in such large projects
as they are closer to the subsidiaries and have a better understanding of the
subsidiary, its business network, and the innovation requirements (Benito et al.
2011; Dellestrand 2011). As such, divisional headquarters may help steering the
network and handle or negotiate conflict with multiple partners (Poppo 2003).
Simultaneously, these large projects are likely to attract attention at the overall
firm-level, and thereby the involvement of corporate headquarters. A larger
innovation network size signals that the project is important and while corporate
headquarters usually restrain their involvement in business matters, they are
likely to become involved in large-scale and resource-intensive projects
(Verbeke and Kenworthy 2008). For large projects, corporate headquarters will
try to complement the value-adding activities of the divisional headquarters. As
a result, we argue that the size of the innovation network leads to dual
headquarters involvement:
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Hypothesis 2: Innovation network size is positively related to dual headquar-
ters involvement in innovation development processes.
Large innovation projects embedded within and beyond the division as well as
involving many partners within and outside the firm will be the ones most likely to
lead to dual headquarters involvement. Indeed, both divisional and corporate
headquarters will see enhanced potential for value addition and problem solving in
these innovation projects.
First, while intra-/inter-divisional embeddedness makes the potential benefits of
the innovation projects for the division and the firm more visible to both types of
headquarters, we argue that this embeddedness in combination with a larger network
size will be associated with even more potential benefits. Seeing more potential in
the innovation projects for the division and for the firm, divisional and corporate
headquarters will have more incentives to become involved in order to secure the
associated benefits.
Second, the complexity and conflicts associated with innovation projects
embedded within and beyond the division are heightened when the projects are
large (Verbeke and Kenworthy 2008). Thus, these projects have greater needs for
coordination. For these projects, both divisional and corporate headquarters can help
because the increased complexity brought by the larger network size makes the
coordination needs more salient at the divisional and at the firm level (Ciabuschi
et al. 2011a; Foss 1997). Divisional headquarters will become involved in these
innovation projects because a larger innovation network makes intra-divisional
conflicts potentially more frequent and harmful. Similarly, corporate headquarters
will become involved in these innovation projects because the inter-divisional
conflicts will be potentially more recurrent and detrimental. Thus, we suggest that
the subsidiary innovation projects that comprise of actors within and beyond the
division as well as a large number of partners within and outside the firm, will lead
to dual headquarters involvement.
Hypothesis 3: The interaction between innovation network size and intra-/
inter-divisional embeddedness will be positively related to dual headquarters
involvement.
4 Data and Methods
This study is part of a larger research project that focuses on innovation activities in
international multibusiness firms. The project includes information about innovation
development activities, as well as innovation transfer activities. This paper focuses
on the innovation development part. A standardized questionnaire was developed to
study innovation development structures and processes in subsidiaries. The
questionnaire has been pre-tested in pilot studies on managers in order to eliminate
or modify ambiguous questions, with the aim of increasing the reliability and face
validity of questionnaire items. Data was collected from 63 subsidiaries of 22 firms.
At the subsidiary level, information concerning 83 innovation development
processes was collected. The average subsidiary in our sample has 740 employees
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(min 3; max 6000) and has been on the market for 51 years (min 3; max 205). The
average division has 13,517 employees (min 100; max 120,000) and the average
firm has 76,812 employees (min 1400; max 420,000).
Data was collected by approaching multibusiness firms that were likely to be
involved in innovation development and transfer processes, asking them to
participate in the study. During the initial meeting with top management, we asked
them to identify subsidiaries that could have been undertaking innovation
endeavours in recent years. Consequently, the sample was generated with the help
of the participating firms which is an appropriate sampling strategy because no
publicly available detailed information on subsidiaries and their innovation
processes exists (Hair et al. 2006).
Data collection focused on subsidiaries because many innovation development
projects are hosted at this level, an assertion which is supported by prior findings in
the literature (Birkinshaw and Hood 1998). Themes that data was collected about
entailed for instance headquarters-subsidiary relations, innovation features, as well
as network relationships. The selection criterion for innovations was based on the
definition of an innovation as ‘‘an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new
by the individual’’ (Rogers 1983, p. 11). The developing subsidiary made this
estimation with respect to innovations that potentially could be included for data
collection.
The data were collected through face-to-face interviews with subsidiary
managers or equivalent respondents who were deemed knowledgeable about the
field of inquiry, namely innovation development, transfer, and exploitation. The
detailed access to innovation development projects and subsidiaries hosting them
increased the possibility of gaining deeper understanding of the questions at hand.
The approach also allowed the detection of inconsistencies during the interviews
and permitted respondents to ask questions about the indicators if they were
uncertain about their meaning. Each of these measures adds to an increased data
quality.
Dependent variable We assessed the simultaneous involvement of both corporate
and divisional headquarters along four dimensions: (1) headquarters has participated
closely in developing the innovation, (2) headquarters has brought competence of
use for the development of the innovation, (3) headquarters has been important
through specifying requests, and (4) the cooperation with headquarters has been
characterized by frequent interaction. Subsidiary managers responded to these items
on a scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) for both types of
headquarters. To ensure that our measure was capturing the simultaneous
involvement of corporate and divisional headquarters, we created dummies to
clearly separate the cases in which both headquarters were involved from those in
which only one type of headquarters was (i.e., 1 if the item score was strictly above
average for both types of headquarters; 0 else). Analogous to Laursen and Salter
(2006), we used the sum of the four dummies. Thus, our dual headquarters
involvement measure range from 0 to 4.
Independent variables Intra-/inter-divisional embeddedness was derived from a
list of the most important counterparts with which the subsidiary interacted with
during the innovation development process (excluding headquarters). We coded
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intra-/inter-divisional embeddedness as 1 if the subsidiary had important partners
both within its division as well as in other divisions of the firm, and 0 otherwise.
Subsidiary innovation network size was measured by counting the number of
organizations within and outside the firm with which the developing subsidiary has
had important exchanges. The scale included the following options: 1 (none), 2
(between 1 and 3), 3 (between 4 and 9), 4 (between 10 and 20), 5 (between 21 and
30), 6 (between 31 and 50) and 7 (more than 50).
Control variables We employ a number of controls in order to further specify
our regression model. To control for location effect, we included a binary
variable of 1 if the subsidiary was located in the same country as the corporate
headquarters (0 else). Subsidiary size and age were included as the natural
logarithms of the number of employees and years since the subsidiary was
founded. Regarding the specificities of the innovation under development, we
included a dummy variable that was coded 1 if the innovation was deemed as a
core innovation and 0 otherwise. Also, to investigate the resource requirements
of the innovation, we asked the respondents to evaluate the following statements
on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): to develop the
innovation technology/process know-how, you had to invest significantly in
(a) specialized equipment and facilities and in (b) skilled human resources
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.67). Finally, we controlled for innovation significance.
This measure aims at capturing if the innovation is potentially valuable only
within the developing subsidiary’s division or also within the rest of the firm.
Respondents were asked to assess the importance of the innovation to (a) the
division/business area, and to (b) the firm as a whole, on a scale of 1 (very low)
to 7 (very high). We transformed these answers into a dichotomous variable by
coding 1 if both answers received values above 3, and 0 otherwise.
Regarding method bias, several ex ante and ex post treatments were
performed. First, the questions and indicators used in this study were spatially
separated in the questionnaire which reduces the risk of respondents’ rational-
izing their answers (Podsakoff et al. 2003). Second, data collection was made in
face-to-face settings with each respondent. This should increase the quality of
the data and consequently also decrease the risk of biases. Third, we combined
questions measured on attitude or perceptional scales with more objective
questions in forms of simple counts (e.g., size of innovation development
network), which should reduce the risk of a common variance. Finally, as an ex
post test, a ‘marker variable’, i.e., a variable theoretically unrelated to the
constructs of interest, was used as a surrogate for method variance (Lindell and
Whitney 2001). This variable answers a question about the level of agreement
(1–7) with the statement ‘Informal communication channels make you aware of
your performance relative to other units’. As expected, we found marginal and
non-significant correlations between the ‘marker’ and the main variables in the
study. In sum, we are confident that our study is not significantly impacted by
common method bias.
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5 Results
Table 1 contains the correlations of the variables in our study. Table 2 presents our
OLS regression results. We used cluster-robust standard errors to account for the
nested data structure in 63 subsidiaries (Bliese and Hanges 2004). Model 1 includes
all direct effects of the proposed model. The model is significant at p\ 0.01 with an
R-squared value of 0.28. Of the control variables, the innovation significance
dummy and the investment requirements are positively related to dual headquarters
involvement, at p\ 0.01 and p\ 0.05, respectively. Subsidiary age is negatively
related to dual headquarters involvement (p\ 0.05). These results are stable across
the models. 60% of the innovation projects in our final sample were taking place in
foreign subsidiaries and the colocation control variable was insignificant across the
different models. The other control variables of core innovation and subsidiary size
were also insignificant in the two models.
Regarding the direct effects of the main variables of the model, i.e., intra-/inter-
divisional embeddedness of the innovating unit and the innovation network size, the
data shows no support for hypothesis 1 while hypothesis 2 is supported (p\ 0.05).
Namely, innovation network size is positively and significantly related to dual
headquarters involvement. Model 2 adds the interaction term. This model is
significant at p\ 0.01 (R-squared 0.30) and provides support for hypothesis 3
(p\ 0.01) while the other coefficients stay robust.
Additional probing of the data reveals that intra-/inter-divisional embeddedness
only becomes significant at relatively larger network sizes (Kingsley et al. 2017).
This infliction point lies at around 1.4 standard deviations above the mean (see
Fig. 1). Thus, intra-/inter-divisional embeddedness is significantly different from
zero and positive when the subsidiary is operating with a relatively large
development network. Approximately 17% of the subsidiaries in our database
operate with such large innovation networks. Thus, a relatively large network (and
its corresponding larger visibility and complexity) is necessary for intra-/inter-
divisional embeddedness to become significant.1 Also, we explored different levels
of intra-/inter-divisional embeddedness and found that the interaction with
innovation network size is insignificant for projects in subsidiaries that are
connected to many partners within the firm. This result suggests that both types of
headquarters might see potential for benefits and conflicts growing with subsidiary
embeddedness and network size and thus decide to become involved, but only until
a certain point of subsidiary embeddedness after which the complexity might be too
high for headquarters to consider their involvement valuable.
Furthermore, we explored several different variable specifications, changing cut-
off values for applicable variables by either adding or subtracting one unit of the
scale without any substantial change in results. Thus, we remain confident that our
approach in terms of cut-off values is appropriate and robust to specification
changes. We also tested for the potential effects of outlier firms and subsidiaries in
the sample and found no reason for concern.
1 Note that the distribution of our network size variable is not significantly different from a normal
distribution.
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6 Discussion
In this paper, we investigate ‘‘dual headquarters involvement’’, a phenomenon that
has remained largely unexplored, both from a theoretical and an empirical
perspective. We contribute to extant literature in several distinct ways. First, we
contribute to the literature on parenting in complex structures (e.g., Ambos and
Mueller-Stewens 2016; Birkinshaw et al. 2006; Foss et al. 2012; Poppo 2003) in
explicating circumstances under which we can expect to observe overlapping
headquarters’ involvement. We theorize on network related aspects (i.e., intra-/
inter-divisional embeddedness and network size) of organizational complexity, and
how this is related to dual headquarters involvement. We identify drivers of and
potential rationales for what may appear as redundant and thus costly headquarters-
subsidiary interaction patterns. Specifically, we show that the size of the innovation
network offers an explanation for such redundancies. Thus, we extend what Poppo
(2003, p. 405) called a ‘‘theory of selective corporate involvement’’ by specifying
influencing factors and their interactions when explaining more than the involve-
ment of just one single (corporate) headquarters. Furthermore, we go beyond
Poppo’s findings by showing that corporate staff not only intervenes in exchanges
between divisions but involve themselves together with divisional headquarters in
subsidiary affairs, i.e., a level further down in the organizational hierarchy. This
adds substantial credit to the idea of greater interdependence between corporate,
Table 2 Results of OLS regression models
Dependent variable: dual headquarters involvement Model 1 Model 2
Corporate headquarters-subsidiary colocation 0.081 (0.259) 0.031 (0.266)
Core innovation 0.193 (0.303) 0.229 (0.298)
Innovation significance 0.511***
(0.160)
0.573***
(0.156)
Investment requirements to develop the innovation 0.198**
(0.087)
0.193**
(0.083)
Subsidiary age -0.284**
(0.111)
-0.271**
(0.113)
Subsidiary size -0.016
(0.056)
-0.016
(0.056)
H1: intra-/inter-divisional embeddedness 0.13 (0.224) 0.029 (0.237)
H2: size of the innovation development network 0.220**
(0.098)
0.173*
(0.095)
H3: intra-/inter-divisional embeddedness * size of the innovation
development network
0.472***
(0.157)
Constant 0.719 (0.548) 0.647 (0.555)
Observations 83 83
R2 0.277 0.298
F 3.67*** 4.78***
Subsidiary-clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
Beyond Simple Configurations: The Dual Involvement of…
123
divisional, and subsidiary activities—contrary to the traditional contingency logic
that emphasizes clear task separation between the different levels of the
organization. Thus, headquarters’ need to create value to the firm leads headquarters
staff to engage in ‘‘finding, creating, and influencing activities in the day-to-day
operations’’ (Poppo 2003, p. 404) of their subsidiaries alongside other headquarters
if necessary.
One principle of the M-form structure is the specialization in decision-making of
corporate headquarters and the divisions: corporate headquarters are responsible for
fundamental decisions such as the firm’s boundaries while the divisions are
responsible for business matters (Stopford and Wells 1972). As such, divisional
headquarters have resources and capabilities that add to the ones of the corporate
headquarters to manage the multibusiness firm. We extend Verbeke and Kenworthy
(2008) argument that corporate headquarters involvement is limited to crisis
situations and large-scale, resource-intensive projects in two ways. First, we show
that a simultaneous involvement of corporate and divisional headquarters in
subsidiary innovation projects is rather common (almost 30% of the projects in our
sample). Yet, it could be that divisional and corporate headquarters engage in
similar and redundant activities or that they engage in different activities that are
complementary and create value. Second, our results also show that large projects
involving many stakeholders attract the involvement of both divisional and
corporate headquarters, especially for innovation projects involving partners within
the business division and within other divisions of the firm. This highlights that
Fig. 1 Marginal effects of intra-/inter-divisional embeddedness on dual headquarters involvement
depending on the size of the innovation development network
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responsibilities are not clearly distinct between the divisional and corporate
headquarters but that they can both become involved in the same business matters
and in similar ways. The leveraging of assets across the whole organization
apparently might not lend itself well to such relatively independent and separated
tasks. Hence, we contribute to the literature that investigates headquarters as a
potentially valuable source of resources and attention and extend the view of
complementarity of headquarters activities in large and complex organizations.
Ultimately, the effective organization of such complex parenting processes might be
one source of competitive advantage of the firm.
Furthermore, we extend the literature that has investigated the question if
headquarters should get involved in cross business unit collaborations or not. As
outlined above, previous literature (mainly informed by the information processing
view) has argued that corporate headquarters has a natural information advantage
when it comes to synergy potential across different divisions. Therefore, we argued
that corporate headquarters involvement and initiative to reap cross-divisional
synergies are warranted. Based on their in-depth case studies, Martin and Eisenhardt
(2010) summarize that cross-divisional initiatives based on rather informal, lateral
networks of collaboration between divisions seem more successful. Our findings
shed some light on this discussion. Based on our results we argue that intra-/inter-
divisional networks are to some extent triggers of headquarters involvement—not
substitutes. As a consequence, we believe that our context of subsidiary-driven
innovation allows us to illustrate a more nuanced picture in which there is no simple
differentiation between lateral networks vs. corporate hierarchy in which those two
organizational processes are directly related to each other. This extends Martin and
Eisenhardt (2010) either-or logic of lateral vs. corporate centric synergy processes.
Moreover, we shed light on a domain of research that has been subject to calls for
more research, namely the issue of subsidiary internal embeddedness (Garcia-Pont
et al. 2009). Besides showing that the internal embeddedness of innovating
subsidiaries matters for the organizational setup of the firm (Meyer et al. 2011), our
findings provide substance to the idea that the subsidiary’s embeddedness in large
innovation development networks affects hierarchical involvement in two distinct
ways: (a) a larger network triggers broader involvement from the hierarchy on the
corporate and the divisional level, and (b), it lets the organization react in a stronger
way to intra-/inter-divisional embeddedness. With these findings, we add to
previous research that has investigated subsidiary embeddedness effects on parent
behavior (e.g., Andersson et al. 2007; Nell and Ambos 2013) by highlighting that
not only the degree of embeddedness matters (the strength of ties or relationships)
but also the type of network in which the subsidiary is embedded, and particularly
the network size.
Finally, while our results are important for the literature on the multibusiness firm
in general, they are also important for the literature on multinational firms in
particular. MNCs are extensively using complex organizational structures with
multiple levels of hierarchy. Not only are MNCs using divisional and regional
structures (Benito et al. 2011; Piekkari et al. 2010; Schotter et al. 2017), MNCs are
also disaggregating parts of their different headquarters in order to fully benefit from
location advantages (Baaij et al. 2015; Slangen et al. 2017). As a result, subsidiaries
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of MNCs have to manage multiple parents, located in different contexts and
geographically dispersed. These complex headquarters systems make communica-
tion more costly and thus more difficult for the different headquarters to know what
the other units (i.e., other headquarters and subsidiaries) are doing (Baaij and
Slangen 2013). The different headquarters become involved in their subsidiaries in
order to ensure that they are following the headquarters’ interests. Yet, because of
the difficulties of communication across contexts and distances, it is more difficult
for the different headquarters to know when to be involved, and how (Ciabuschi
et al. 2011b). As Foss and colleagues (2012) have argued, the network-based MNCs
are more likely to experience harmful intervention of headquarters in their
subsidiaries. This should especially be the case when there are multiple headquar-
ters involved as the contexts in which they are embedded differ and so do their goals
and interests. Our study shows that dual headquarters involvement is a common
phenomenon, and although it is particularly relevant for MNCs, it has received little
attention from international management scholars. Recently, a few have concep-
tually addressed the problems that can be associated with dual agency of corporate
and divisional or regional headquarters (see Ambos and Mahnke 2010; Hoenen and
Kostova 2015). We encourage international management scholars to pursue in this
direction.
7 Concluding Remarks
The nature of the headquarters of multibusiness firms is only partially understood,
and this study is an initial attempt to highlight the complexities that are inherent in
contemporary headquarters. In a nutshell, our results suggest that parenting in
complex structures is complex itself. It often involves the simultaneous involvement
of more than one headquarters and because of the costs associated with such dual
headquarters involvement, it is done selectively by multibusiness firms.
By questioning the overly simplistic views of the headquarters of the
multibusiness firm, this paper contributes to the emerging literature on parenting
in complex structures (e.g., Birkinshaw et al. 2006; Foss et al. 2012; Poppo 2003;
Galbraith 2009). A key feature of the innovation development process is the
network embeddedness of the firm hosting the development. Characteristics
connected to the innovation development process is used for explaining what
otherwise may be conceived as redundant, complex and overly costly headquarters-
subsidiary interaction patterns, i.e., dual headquarters involvement in innovation
development. We show that the configuration of the innovation network helps in
explaining dual headquarters involvement. If the subsidiary engaged in the
development process is embedded in a large development network, the effects of
intra-/inter-divisional embeddedness are augmented. In short, this extends what
Poppo (2003, p. 405) called a ‘‘theory of selective corporate involvement’’ by
specifying factors and their interactions when explaining the involvement of more
than a single (corporate) headquarters. This reasoning is in contrast to the additive
nature of headquarters complementarities of the M-form organization where
divisional and corporate headquarters activities are clearly separated from each
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other (e.g., Verbeke and Kenworthy 2008). Hence, we conceptualize headquarters
as a valuable source of resources and extend the understanding of potential
complementarities of multiple headquarters activities in large and complex
organizations. Furthermore, we show that the complexity associated with internal
embeddedness and a large innovation network is related to dual headquarters
involvement only until a certain point of internal embeddedness after which the
complexity might be too high for headquarters to consider their involvement as a
value-adding activity. This enables us to explain how headquarters act and how
innovations are managed by different layers of the hierarchy above the focal
innovating unit. Thus, this paper extends the understanding of the management of
innovations in large diversified firms by bringing the presence of simultaneous
headquarters involvement to the fore. This is a novel approach illustrating a
phenomenon that has received scarce empirical and conceptual attention in the
literature. This allows for a more holistic (and realistic) view that accounts for
simultaneous governance by several headquarters within multibusiness firms.
Dual headquarters involvement is also important from a managerial point of
view, especially in light of the importance attributed to dispersed innovation
activities (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Hamel and Prahalad 1994; Rugman and
Verbeke 2001). To sustain innovation and the competitive advantage of the firm,
managers must be able to recognize instances where multiple headquarters are likely
to be pushed and pulled into increasing involvement. Important questions include
which factors might call for stronger involvement and if it is enough to involve
divisional headquarters. It is important to note that generic answers claiming that
lean management styles and a general principle of non-interference of corporate
headquarters in divisional affairs seems inappropriate. On the contrary, our findings
mirror recent calls for more ‘‘active’’ headquarters where it is argued that
headquarters need to get a better ‘‘feel’’ for their subsidiaries’ operations in order to
be able to add value (Goold and Campbell 2002).
Several limitations should be kept in mind in evaluating the findings and
conclusions. First, while this is an initial attempt of going beyond simple
conceptualizations of headquarters activities, it should be noted that we are
scratching the top of the complexities that contemporary multibusiness headquarters
are challenged with. As such, we consider our quantitative study to be one of the
first to capture the top two layers of corporate units and their simultaneous
interaction in innovation development projects. Relatedly, we employ relatively
coarse-grained measures of our key constructs of dual headquarters involvement as
well as intra-/inter-divisional embeddedness and innovation network size. However,
we believe that our approach is justifiable because of the early status of the
literature. Future research could measure dual headquarters involvement and its
antecedents in a more elaborate way and detail further the way how we conceive
multiple involvements from hierarchical levels above the innovating subsidiary. For
example, it would be interesting to look into when divisional and corporate
headquarters are involved over the development of the innovation projects and how
both types of headquarters differ in the ways that they become involved. Second,
while considering performance outcomes of dual headquarters involvement was
outside of the scope of this study, it is a crucial element of complex parenting
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structures. In particular, dual headquarters involvement has been considered
unlikely because of the associated overlaps of authority and interaction (Williamson
1975) and future research should investigate how dual headquarters involvement
influences the duration and costs of subsidiary innovation projects, as well as the
subsequent impact on the performance of the subsidiary. Related to this point, the
cross-sectional nature of our study was limiting our analysis and future research
should investigate the antecedents of dual headquarters involvement prior to
measuring the involvement itself and subsequently look at the outcomes of it (see
e.g. the recent longitudinal study of boundary spanning activities of corporate
headquarters by Birkinshaw et al. 2017). Third, while we contend that subsidiary
innovation projects offer a fertile testing ground for the furthering of theory on the
nature of the headquarters, the sample of innovations under study ran the risk of
being successful, i.e., there is a risk under-sampling of failure (Denrell 2003). On
the balancing side, we have empirically shown that the innovations are indeed
heterogeneous in a number of dimensions ranging from relatedness to perceived
importance. Fourth, given the absence of sampling frames for subsidiary innova-
tions, we used managers and snowball sampling to identify the innovation projects
to be investigated. Despite proving to be an effective way of identifying
suitable innovation projects, this sampling approach potentially limits the gener-
alizability of our findings.
Although the current study offers only initial insights into complex headquarters
configurations, it highlights the importance of exploring subsidiary-level activities
in greater detail in order to understand factors underlying headquarters involvement.
In fact, while much is known of individual headquarters and their activities, we are
witnessing an increase in the complexity of what could be named complex
headquarters systems (Nell et al. 2017). For example, Desai (2009, p. 1284)
formulates that we are now witnessing firms that are ‘‘Bermuda-incorporated, Paris-
headquartered (…), listed on the NYSE [New York Stock Exchange] with US-style
investor protections and disclosure rules, a chief information officer in Bangalore, a
chief finance officer in Brussels and a chief operating officer in Beijing’’. Future
studies could address the lack of attention to these complex headquarters systems
and thereby break with the dominant logic that views headquarters as a single,
identifiable unit located at the apex of the organization.
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